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Indonesia is a perfect example of how poorly a country can handle the spread of
coronavirus (COVID-19). In February, when Indonesia’s neighbouring countries such
as Singapore were occupied with the restriction of the entry of foreigners into their
territory after the announcement of the coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan, Indonesia’s
government under the Presidency of Joko Widodo (Jokowi) introduced the opposite
policy which made it easier for foreign tourists (including those from the mainland
China) to travel to Indonesia. The purpose of this particular policy according to
Jokowi’s government was to exploit the economic gaps which would arise from
foreigners’ fears of travelling to Indonesia’s neighbours including Singapore and
Thailand.
At that time Jokowi’s government dismissed any significant risk from coronavirus:
the Minister of Health, Dr Terawan, described coronavirus is only a “small disease”
and those infected would heal by themselves. Based on this belief he stressed that
Indonesia would not need to worry or take special measures to contain the virus.
Not only that, Jokowi’s Vice President, a conservative Muslim cleric, Ma’ruf Amin,
said that Indonesia will be immune from coronavirus citing that most of Indonesia’s
clerics had recited the qunut (an Islamic prayer to prevent diseases). This delayed
reaction proved fatal, as not too long afterward by mid-March, it was evidenced
that the Indonesian people were no more immune from COVID-19 than any other.
In the face of this, Indonesia’s government was shown not to be ready to face this
pandemic as a result of the poor state of the health system.
#LockDownOrDie
In distinction from other countries in Asia that have been considered as the
successful examples in containing the spread of COVID-19, such as Taiwan or
Singapore in adopting a transparent approach to communication with the public, in
early March when the virus had begun to enter Indonesia, the Jokowi’s government
attempted to hide the fact from the public. The Minister of Health issued a statement
that in Jakarta – the Indonesian capital and also its most populous city – there was
not a single case of coronavirus, which was later contradicted by Jakarta’s Governor,
who stated that cases of coronavirus had already occurred in many areas of Jakarta.
As of 6 March, Indonesia’s government treatment to coronavirus was minimal: it had
only tested 450 individuals.
As a consequence of this lack of early intervention, by early April, 2,738 people
have been confirmed to have been infected with coronavirus in Indonesia, with 221
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confirmed deaths: the highest death rate in Southeast Asia, and one of the highest
coronavirus mortality rate in the world with the average of 9.1 percent death rate
compared to 5.2 percent worldwide. There is some concern that this number may not
be an accurate representation, because overall, the government had only conducted
6,534 rapid tests by the end of March, even though Indonesia has a population of
270 million.
This situation has caused widespread distrust of Jokowi’s government’s ability to
handle the coronavirus. This can be observed from the emergence of a people
desperate hashtag #LockDownOrDie on social media, which demands the Jokowi
government to immediately performing a lockdown, especially in Jakarta, which is
the focal point for the country coronavirus spread.
The demands of the Indonesian people for a lockdown are arguably reasonable in
light of the 1,443 confirmed cases of coronavirus within the capital. Indonesia also
has a comprehensive legal mechanism to support such a lockdown, namely the
Indonesian Law No. 6 of 2011 on Health Quarantine (Health Quarantine law). This
law gives Indonesia’s central government the power to declare health emergency
(darurat kesehatan) status if they find any disease that has a risk to spread to the
people, this status would allow the government to perform a large-scale social
limitation, which enables government to close schools and workplaces as well as
restrict any social and religious activities in certain areas. It would also incentivise
the government to perform regional quarantine, in which the government can limit
the entry and exit of the people in a particular area if they find out the disease was
spread among the people in that area, based on laboratory confirmation. The Health
Quarantine Law also imposes a duty on government during the quarantine under
Article 55, that:
“During the Regional Quarantine, the basic needs of the people and the
livestock in the quarantine area are under the responsibility of the central
government.”
While the Health Quarantine Law provides a strong legal framework and legal
justification to Jokowi’s government to accept people’s demands for lockdowns,
especially through the mechanism of regional quarantine, no such action has
been taken. After his cabinet meeting on March 30, instead of declaring the health
emergency status, Jokowi considered using the civilian emergency (darurat
sipil) status as contained in the Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 23
Year 1959 on Emergency Situation (Emergency Law). At first glance, the civilian
emergency status appears to be an answer for people’s demands to lockdown,
because through this status his government can prohibit people to leave their house
or particular area during the emergency, similar with health emergency status in
Health Quarantine Law.
Health Quarantine Law vs. Emergency Law
There is, however, a fundamental difference between the civilian emergency status
in the Emergency Law and the health emergency status in the Health Quarantine
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Law. The difference lies in the purpose of these two mechanisms: the Health
Quarantine Law aims to overcome an emergency that comes from the spread
of diseases, that is why this Law is based on Article 28H of the Indonesian 1945
Constitution, which guarantees the right to health. Meanwhile, the Emergency Law
was formed to overcome the danger that threatens the unity of the state such as the
war and conflict situation, and so relies on Article 12 of the 1945 Constitution which
regulates the President’s exclusive power to declare the state of emergency as the
basis of its formation. 
Evidence that the objectives of Emergency Law were intended to handle a conflict
or war rather than pandemic crisis, can be seen in the substance of this law, which
distinguishes emergency into three levels, namely a civilian emergency; a military
emergency; and a martial emergency. The Emergency Law explains that the civilian
emergency is a condition when some or even large parts of Indonesia’s legal order
are threatened by armed rebellion or civilian conflicts so it cannot be handled
through ordinary measures, whereas if such conditions lead to war or endanger the
existence of the state, then the President can replace it with military emergency or
martial emergency. 
The Emergency Law also states that, when the President declares any of these
three forms of emergency, he is then acting in his position as the commander in chief
of the army. The activities of the Indonesian Parliament and other state institutions
such as the Court would also be suspended during this emergency status. During
a civilian emergency, the President would perform his governmental duties with
the assistance of a single body only, consisting of several ministers, the chief of
police, and the commanders of each military branch. The President would also have
a representative in every Indonesian province during the civilian emergency, the
“regional ruler” (Penguasa Darurat Sipil Daerah), a position which was held by the
governor of each Indonesia’s province. The regional ruler would be assisted by the
police chief and military commander in their area. The strong involvement of the
military certainly shows that the status of civilian emergency is more appropriate to
be applied in a conflict situation rather than a pandemic crisis as Indonesia is facing
today.
As its primary objective is to maintain the unity of the state in a situation of conflict,
the civilian emergency is also driven by different basic principle than the status
of health emergency. The health emergency status gives the government full
responsibility to provide the needs of the peoples during the (regional or national)
quarantine, and the activation of this status will also not cause the suspension to
the work of Parliament and other state institutions. On the other side, since the
main goal of the Emergency Law was to maintain the integrity of the state, it is the
citizens who are given the responsibility to serve the governments. This can be
seen from the provisions in Emergency Law that allow the President to limit the flow
of information, to seize private properties, and to use of public facilities during the
civilian emergency. The declaration of civilian emergency also does not create any
responsibility for the government to provide the basic needs of the people when they
restrict people’s movement in a particular area. 
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A Military Interest?
It is clear that Jokowi’s government’s desire to establish a civilian emergency status
is not compatible with popular calls for lockdown as a medical measure. Shortly after
this discourse rolled out, public criticism arose and called upon President Jokowi to
declare a health emergency rather than a civilian emergency. The public pressure
was successful, and on March 31 Jokowi declared a health emergency status
instead of a civilian emergency, which was followed by his government’s decision to
impose large-scale social limitations in Jakarta on April 7.
However, despite this development, it does not mean that the idea to perform civilian
emergency is completely gone, because shortly after declaring health emergency
status, Jokowi warned that his government is still ready to activate the civilian
emergency status if he found the health emergency status doesn’t work well. The
government’s determination to establish a civilian emergency status raises concerns
of a strong influence from military figures within the Jokowi administration to take
this step, as it would  strengthen the position of military in Indonesian politics. It is
an open secret that the military is one of the strongest forces in Indonesia’s political
landscape, even though Indonesia has been transitioned from military dictatorship to
democracy in 1998.
This context is likely the reason for Jokowi, a President without a military background
to maintain their support, to consider steps to keep his power. That is also why
he appointed many military figures to his government including his Minister of
Health, Terawan, a former military doctor. It possibly made Jokowi prefer to use
a militaristic approach rather than medical in dealing with the coronavirus plague
that hit Indonesia, and it is demonstrated not only by his government’s desire to
activate civilian emergency but also by his appointment of Doni Monardo – a former
leader of Military’s elite unit – as the Chairman of COVID-19 Rapid Response Task
Force. Whatever the reason, this idea is not appropriate, because the establishment
of a civilian emergency and the involvement of the military in the fights against
coronavirus has the potential to endanger Indonesian democracy, which in recent
years has experienced a significant setback.
Of course, every lockdown has implications for individual freedoms and possibly for
democracy. However, adopting a lockdown in combination with a civilian emergency
status will make the restriction to people’s rights more excessive than necessary
since it will allow to limit the flow of information and to bring back the role of the
military into Indonesia’s public life. Besides that, it also will not help the effort to
contain the coronavirus because one of the main reasons for Indonesia’s poor
handling of coronavirus is the government’s attitude which is not transparent to its
people.
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